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LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO SPECTATORS
GARY E. SISKIND7
Spectator sport has been a part of our culture and history almost
as long as there have been people to witness the playing of games.
Similarly the problem of legal liability has been with us since early
civilizations. In Roman times it was written:
If persons are throwing javelins by way of sport and a slave is killed, the
Aquilian action lies: but if when others are throwing javelins in a field,
a slave crosses it, the Aquilian action fails, because he ought not to have
made his way at an inopportune time across the field used for javelin
throwing.1
It would seem from this that the Romans recognized the right of
spectators to recover in the event of injuries suffered while observing
a sport so long as they were in their proper place. It is only when the
slave has wandered from this spot that he is not allowed to pursue his
remedy. This has been interpreted to mean that the second slave is
denied recovery on the basis of voluntary assumption of risk.2 From
this rather liberal view of liability the law has evolved to the point
where authors can state without fear of contradiction
If a person watches a dangerous sport, it can hardly be doubted that he
will be deemed to have consented to the inevitable risks involved
whether or not he actually knew of or consented to them.3
What caused such a transformation? One can only speculate that as
time wore on and sports became more and more popular, the courts
felt a need to protect those engaged in developing and promoting
atheltics. A love of heroes, and especially sports heroes, seems to be
an integral part of our culture and perhaps this feeling permeated our
attitudes until athletics became so sacrosanct as to bar recovery
except in cases of gross negligence. With this in mind let us look at a
recent example.
Bill Hewitt, at the recent All-Star Game of the National Hockey
League played at Maple Leaf Gardens in Toronto, described how
Bobby Baun crossed the blue line and caromed the puck off the goal
post into the crowd where another lucky fan had a souvenir of that
21st annnual All-Star Game. To anyone listening at home the inci-
dent was simply another exciting moment in the game. But to the
"lucky" fan, 7 year old Larry Grafstein, the episode included the
permanent loss of one and possibly two teeth, a swollen mouth, some
loss of blood, and a worried mother and father. This mishap was
hardly an isolated occurrence4 and with more and more leisure time
-* Gary E. Siskind, B.A. (Western) LL.B. (Osgoode) is a member of the
1968 graduating class of Osgoode Hall Law School.
I ULPIAiN, RoiIAI DIGEsT L. ix. 2.9.4
2 Burnett, Dann v. Hamilton Revisited (1960) 38 CAN. B. REv. 107, 111.
3 Payne Assumption of Risk and Negligence (1957) 35 CAN. B. RaV. 950,
953-54.
4 In an interview with Stan Obodiak, Public Relations Director of Maple
Leaf Gardens, it was discovered that approximately 12-15 pucks find their
way into the crowd in an average game. That is about 500 pucks a season at
the Gardens alone.
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becoming available the result can only be more participants, more
games, more spectators, and inevitably more injuries. Whether people
like Larry Grafstein are granted recovery will be of growing import-
ance for the future and will furnish the subject-matter of this paper.
Generally we are concerned with the hapless fan who suddenly
finds himself the target of such diverse objects as hockey pucks, base-
balls, racing cars and even wrestlers. Obviously the subject is of
particular importance for sports such as hockey, baseball, auto-racing
and golf around which the majority of cases brought to court have
centred.
THE PRESENT POSITION
Basically, the courts have stringently adhered to the doctrine of
volenti non fit injuria. When a spectator buys a ticket to watch a
sporting event, be it hockey, baseball, auto-racing, or horse shows, the
general belief is that the person does so at his own risk. He is pre-
sumed to accept the risk of being injured as the price he pays for
being allowed to watch the particular event. It is relevant to our
search for a remedy for the Larry Grafsteins to examine how three
different jurisdictions approach the problem.
England: One of the leading English cases in this field is Hall v.
Brooklands Auto-Racing Club5 where two spectators were killed as a
result of a racing car crashing into the crowd. The English Court of
Appeal, basing their decision on the aforementioned doctrine, held
that there was no liability. This attitude towards the problem is best
exemplified by the statement:
No.one expects the persons receiving payment to erect such structures or
nets that no spectator can be hit by a ball kicked or hit violently from
the field of play towards the spectators. The field is safe to stand on, and
the spectators take the risk of the game.6
The extent to which the absence of liability has gone is aptly
shown in the case of Murray v. Harringay Arena.7 In this case a 6
year old boy was hit by a puck while attending a hockey match at
the defendant arena. In holding that there was no liability, the court
emphasized two important facts: first, that the volenti doctrine pro-
vides a valid defence in such cases and second, that the test under that
maxim is as to the reasonable spectator, and not the particular one, for
consent was found on the part of a 6 year old child. Further, in dis-
cussing hockey, the court pointed out the difficulties to be confronted
by the plaintiff.
I do not think it can be said upon the evidence that the game of ice hockey
is intrinsically dangerous to spectators.$
5 [1933] 1 K.B. 205 (C.A.).
6 Id., at 215 per Scrutton, L.J.
7 [1951) 2 K.B. 529 (C.A.).
8 Id., at 534 per Singleton, L.J.
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This line of thinking culminated in the recent decision of Wool-
dridge v. Sumner.9 Here a photographer at a horse show was injured
by a horse in one of the equestrian events. He had been standing off
the course but the horse was going too fast and was unable to turn
away in time. Despite the photographer's lack of knowledge and
experience with horses, it was held that there was no liability either
on the part of the rider or the organizers. The court was split how-
ever, on why liability was denied. Lord Justice Sellers and Lord
Justice Diplock both held for the defendant on the basis that there
was no prima facie tort of negligence and denied that volenti applied,
while Lord Justice Danckwerts reached the same conclusion respecting
liability but did so by applying the volenti doctrine. The Wooldridge
decision is important also for the emphasis placed on allowing com-
petitors to go all-out to attain victory.
A reasonable spectator attending voluntarily to witness any game or
competition knows and presumably desires that a reasonable participant
will concentrate his attention upon winning, and if the game or competi-
tion is a fast-moving one, will have to exercise his judgment and attempt
to exert his skill in what, in the analogous context of contributory negli-
gence, is sometimes called 'the agony of the moment'0
Thus the basic view taken in England of the problem of injuries to
spectators can be summed up in these words discussing the Wooldridge
case:
A person attending a game or competition takes the risk of any damage
caused to him by any act of a participant done in the course of and for
the purpose of the game or competition notwithstanding that such act
may involve an error or judgment or a lapse of skill, unless the partici-
pant's conduct is deliberately intended to injure someone whose presence
is known, or is reckless and in disregard of all safety of others so that it
is a departure from the standard which might reasonably be expected in
anyone pursuing the game or competition."
Canada: In Canada a similar result has been reached. Two cases are
of importance in this regard, the first being Elliott v. Amphitheatre
Ltd.12 Here the plaintiff, who was allowed to select his own seat, was
hit by a puck while attending a hockey game. Recovery was denied
him on the basis that there was no breach of duty.
Reasonable care is held to be the measure of duty, and the proprietor is
held not to be an insurer and spectators assume the risk peculiar to that
form of amusement.13
Again we notice the emphasis placed on assumption of risk.
The second case is Payne v. Maple Leaf Gardens Ltd.14 Here the
plaintiff, a season ticket holder and hence familiar with the sport,
while attending a Maple Leaf hockey game was struck, not by a puck,
but by the stick of one of the players who was grappling with an
9 [19631 2 Q.B. 43 (C.A.).
10 Id., at 67 per Diplock, L.J.
11 Dworkin Injuries to Spectators in the Course of Sporting Activities
(1962) 25 MOD. L. R. 738, 740/1.
12 [19341 3 W.W.R. 225 (Man. S. Ct.).
13 Id., at 228 per MacDonald, C.J.
14 [1949] 1 D.L.R. 369 (Ont. C.A.).
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opposing player in front of the plaintiff. The plaintiff recovered
against the player who hit her but not against the Gardens. In reach-
ing this conclusion Mr. Justice Laidlaw reaffirmed the volenti defence
but held that it did not apply to the particular facts of the case before
him.
I think the misadventure was of so unusual and unexpected a kind that it
could not reasonably have been expected.' 5
and further:
But, while they had such knowledge and assumed such risk, it cannot be
properly held that either of them assumed the risk of injuries resulting
directly from negligence or improper conduct on the part of the player.16
Thus the difficulty of establishing liability is as evident in Canada as
it is in England and no doubt accounts for the lack of litigation on the
subject.
United States: In the United States liability is founded upon a sport
by sport distinction which is based on what the court feels is the
extent of knowledge of the sport by the public. For instance the gen-
eral rule respecting baseball (often referred to as America's National
Pastime17) is that the public is presumed to know that at certain times
batted balls will be hit into the stands and therefore is presumed to
have accepted the risk.
It is common knowledge that in baseball games hard balls are thrown and
batted with great swiftness, that they are liable to be thrown or batted
outside the lines of the diamond, and that spectators in positions which
may be reached by such balls assume the risk thereof.1 8
But hockey, not having the exposure that baseball has (particu-
larly before this year's expansion in the United States) is therefore
not subject to as stringent a set of rules. In Morris v. Cleveland Hockey
Club19 the plaintiff was allowed recovery after being hit by a puck.
In emphasizing this distinction the court stated:
Although hockey is becoming ever more popular, it is not nearly so uni-
versally played as is baseball, and as we have pointed out, its dangers are
certainly not so obvious to a stranger to the game as would be the
dangers incident to baseball. 20
There are many other cases affirming this view.2'
However the distinction is not based so much on the different
sports as the extent to which the area involved is held to be familiar
15 Id., at 371.
16 Id., at 373.
17 There is even judicial mention of this view. See, Morris v. Cleveland
Hockey Club 105 N.E. (2d) 419, 426 (1952) where Stewart, J. states simply
that "Baseball is the national pastime of the United States".
Is Cincinnati Baseball Club v. Eno 147 N.E. 86, 87 (1925) (Ohio Supreme
Court) per Allen, J.
19 105 N.E. (2d) 419 (1952) (Ohio Supreme Court).
20 Id., at 426 per Stewart, J.
21 See e.g. Shanney v. Boston Madison Square Garden Corpn. 5 N.E. (2d)
1 (1937) (Mass. S. Ct.).
James v. Rhode Island Auditorium, Inc. 199 Atl. 293 (1938) (Rhode Is.
S. Ct.).
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with the sport. For example in Minnesota, a hockey-playing area, it
was stated:
Hockey is played to such an extent in this region and its risks are so well
known to the general public that as to the question before us there is no
difference in fact between the two games so far as liability for flying
baseballs and pucks is involved.22
Thus despite the fact that the chances of recovering in the United
States are greater than in either the United Kingdom or Canada, the
basis for such recovery does not give spectators in either jurisdiction
cause for rejoicing. As the exposure of different sports through tele-
vision becomes ever increasing, the present arguments on which
successful American plaintiffs have been basing their claims will
become increasingly less valid.
THE DEFENCE OF VOLENTI
Implied Assumption of Risk
The maxim volenti non fit injuria is a terse expression of the individual-
istic tendency of the common law, which, proceeding from the people and
asserting their liberties, naturally regards the freedom of individual
action as the keystone of the whole structure. Each individual is left free
to work out his own destinies; he must not be interfered with from with-
out, but in the absence of such interference he is held competent to protect
himself 23
These words express the philosophy of volenti but it can be better
explained by reference to some well-known authors.
For instance it has been said that the maxim means that there is
no longer any duty of care owing to the plaintiff. That is, that the
Plaintiff agrees to absolve the defendent from the duty of care that would
otherwise be his due, with the result that the latter's carelessness would
not qualify as a breach of duty at all. 24
Similarly Dean Prosser explained volenti in this way:
The plaintiff has consented to relieve the defendant of an obligation of
conduct toward him, and to take his chance of injury from a known
risk.25
From these general outlines, more specific requisites emerge, the
most important being that the risk assumed must be comprehended.
The defence is predicated upon full knowledge of the risk to be encoun-
tered.26
It is this point that makes the decision in Murray v. Harringay Arena
Ltd.27 even more difficult to understand for if complete comprehension
is needed, surely it must be subjective and if subjective it would seem
22 Modec v. City of Eveleth 29 N.W. (2d) 453, 456 (1947) (MVinn. S. Ct.)
per Olson, J.
23 Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk (1906-07) 20 HARv. L. REv. 14.
24 J. FLEMING, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS (1st ed.) 1967,
pg. 145.
25 PROSSER ON TORTS (1st ed.) 1941, pg. 377.
26 J. FILE-nG, Tms LAW OF TORTS (2nd ed.) 1961, 254.
27 Supra note 7.
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difficult indeed to impute such comprehension to even the most pre-
cocious six year old. The Murray decision states that the test of com-
prehension is that of the reasonable man28 but it is fallacious to sug-
gest that a 6 year old child should be held to have accepted any risk
except to the extent that a reasonable 6 year old would have accepted
such a risk. Thus, the test that should be adopted would be similar
to that of the infant in negligence cases.29
An American decision, Aldes v. St. Paul Baseball Club, Inc.,30
adopts this point of view. In that case a 12 year old boy was hit by a
baseball while attending a ball game. In holding that there was no
assumption of risk on the part of such a youngster it was said:
I see no reason for holding him to the same standard of sober reflection
which we would require of an adult.31
However, not everyone attributes the plaintiff's lack of success to
volenti. It has been said that:
The implied consent of the spectators operates to lower the standard of
care owing to them, not to provide a defence of volenti non fit injuria.32
In fact the attack on volenti has reached the stage where academics
such as Fleming can say that "the defence is today wellnigh mori-
bund".33 But if this is true then the news has not seeped through the
walls of the chambers of the English Court of Appeal,34 the Ontario
Court of Appeal35 and the Indiana Supreme Court. 36
One of the limitations often cited is that the defence is not appli-
cable to cases involving negligence.37 The theory behind this is that
one consents only to those risks that are reasonably forseeable and
someone's negligence is not reasonably to be foreseen. More will be
said of this limitation below.
EXPRESS ASSUMPTION OF RISK
The above discussion is concerned with implied assumption of
risk but in many instances a spectator is denied recovery because of
some clause written on his ticket or on a nearby sign. This is referred
to as an express assumption of risk.
28 Supra, note 7 at 536.
29 See Gough v. Thorne [1966] 3 All E.R. 398 (C.A.).; Cowning v. G.T.
Ry. Co. (1921) 38 D.L.R. 423 (Ont. S. Ct.); Charbonneau v. MacRury 153 Ati.
457 (1931) (N.H.S.Ct.).
30 88 N.W. 2d 94 (1958) (Minn. S. Ct.).
31 Id., at 97 per Dell, J.
32 Dworkin, Injuries to Spectators in the Course of Sporting Activities
(1962) 25 MOD. L. R. 738, 740.
33 Supra, note 24 at 146.
34 Wooldridge v. Sumner [1936] 2 Q.B. 43 where the defence was recog-
nized at least by Danckwerts, L.J.
35 Hambley v. Shepley (1967) 63 D.L.R. (2d) 94 where Laskin, J.A.
although holding that the defence was inapplicable on the facts of the par-
ticular case, nevertheless recognized that there was still such a defence
available.
36 Hunsberger v. Wyman 216 N.E. 2d 345 (1966) where Rakestraw, J. dis-
allowed recovery partly on the basis of assumption of risk.
37 See Dann v. Hamilton [1939] 1 K.B. 509 (K.B.D.) and also CHARLEs-
WORTH, THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE (1st ed.) 1938, 160.
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The general rule in these cases is primarily that the clause is to
be construed strictly and against the person relying on it. 38 Further,
the contract must be "freely and deliberately entered into39 and con-
tain "words that are clear and beyond the possibility of misunder-
standing". 40 The purchaser must also have been reasonably able to
read the ticket or see the sign.4 1
But the most important aspect of these clauses from our point
of view centres on distinguishing between clauses explicitly exculpat-
ing liability in cases where the defendant is negligent and clauses
where negligence is not mentioned. This distinction has been lucidly
stated as follows:
Where the head of damage in respect of which limitation of liability is
sought to be imposed by such a clause is one which rests on negligence
and nothing else, the clause must be construed as extending to that head
of damage, because it would otherwise lack subject-matter. Where, on the
other hand, the head of damage may be based on some other ground than
that of negligence, the general principal is that the clause must be con-
fined in its application to loss occurring through that other cause to the
exclusion of loss arising through negligence.42
Thus if there is no mention of negligence on the ticket or sign the
defence of express assumption of risk will be useless where the defend-
ant is indeed negligent. The relevance of this will become obvious
below.
When discussing such clauses, the phrase "public policy" imme-
diately comes to mind for it seems at first glance that something
should be done to prevent operators from writing tickets and contracts
that are so complete as to disallow liability for all but criminal actions.
However, the general rule is that "there is no public policy which
prevents the parties from contracting as they see fit".43 Coupled with
this is the fact that in many cases the public either "plays the game
according to the rules" or does without. These monopolistic overtones
are difficult if not impossible to overcome and sporting events provide
excellent examples of the public's being forced to accept stringent
liability rules or do without attendance at the games.
The efforts by the courts to overcome this problem have not
been as successful as they might otherwise be. Nowhere is it stated
for instance, that these clauses should not be allowed where the pur-
chaser's only option is doing without the subject-matter of the con-
tract. There is a problem of over-regulation of free enterprise but
this must be balanced by consideration of the impotence of one of the
contracting parties compared to the other. More protection than is
now possible should be given the weaker of these parties. After all,
when you buy a ticket to a game or for a parking spot you surely
38 White v. John Warwick & Co. Ltd. [19531 1 W.L.R. 1285, 1292 (C.A.).
per Singleton, L.J.
39 Id., at 1293 per Denning, L.J.
40 Id., at 1293.
41 Olley v. Marlborough Court Ltd. [1949] 1 K.B. 532, 549 per Denning,L.J.
42 Alderslade v. Hendon Laundry Ltd. [1945] 1 K.B. 189, 192 (C.A.). per
Greene, M.R.
43 PROSSER ON TORTS (1st ed.) 1941, 380.
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must be entitled to more than just the space provided. At the least,
protection from negligence should be granted no matter what the
ticket states and in the absence of legislation, it is the court's duty to
see that this is accomplished.
A LOOK AT AN INDIVIDUAL CASE AND SOME INTERESTING
STATISTICS
The example of Larry's Grafstein 44 serves to illustrate what hap-
pens in cases such as those under examination here. He was sitting
in the "blues" behind one of the goals and in Maple Leaf Gardens this
puts him a relatively lengthy distance from the ice surface. The puck
hit him just below the centre of his lower lip and as aforementioned
knocked out one permanent tooth and there is a strong possibility
another will have to be taken out. After the incident, Larry was taken
to the Gardens' first aid room where the bleeding was stopped by the
attendants. Nothing more was done to him nor was an offer made to
take him to a hospital. The parents, on their own initiative took him
to their dentist for a more thorough examination. Larry's father
subsequently wrote the Gardens asking them to pay the medical bills.
A refusal by phone was not long in coming. It is interesting to note
also that the Grafsteins, who used to sit nearer the ice, intentionally
moved to their present seats so as to be better protected from flying
pucks.
The ticket purchased by the Grafsteins contained nothing what-
soever alluding to excluding liability on the part of the owners.
45
Further, there are no signs to the effect posted around the arena.
Physically the rink is built with a ring of boards about 43/2 feet high
surrounding the ice surface with glass 51 feet high on top of this at
either end behind the goals. The other parts of the rink are protected
by glass about 3 feet high but the two areas where the players of
each team sit have no glass whatsoever. 46 The other arenas around
the National Hockey League do not differ substantially but in many
of the minor league arenas and in older facilities in most cities in
Canada, there is simply a high net behind the goals with no protection
along the sides.
These figures become relevant in the light of the information
that approximately once every five games someone is sufficiently
injured by a puck to require medical attention.47
This is always given without charge by the medical staff at the
Gardens. At the above rate, about 7 people a year would be injured
at the Gardens with more than 80 such injuries throughout the
League in a year. Obviously the protection afforded is not as good as
44 The facts concerning Larry's injury were obtained from an interview
with Larry's father, Mr. Jerry Grafstein who, by coincidence, is a lawyer
here in Toronto.
45 There is an advertisement on the back of the ticket.
46 A distance of approximately 60 feet.
47 A figure obtained from the interview with Mr. Obodiak referred to
upra, note 4.
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it could be when that many people require medical aid. As of now
there are no plans for either extension of glass protection or new
safety innovations in the Gardens. It could thus be argued that the
Gardens is negligent in not providing better safety features for their
arena. However, this argument is diluted somewhat because of the
lack of such plans in other arenas and thus the familiar defence of
"custom" would prove difficult to overcome.
These are the facts and figures in hockey but similar statistics
may be found in baseball.48 Approximately 50 people per year require
medical attention as a result of being hit by a baseball in the average
major league baseball park.4 9 Of course baseball injuries are relatively
few in Canada as the sport is not nearly as popular nor are there as
many stadiums as there are in the United States. The result in the
United States, as mentioned above, is that recovery is denied and it
has reached such a point there that judicial notice is taken that every-
one is deemed to know of the dangers of baseball and therefore
assumes the risk thereof.5 0 It is not too difficult to imagine the exten-
sion of such judicial notice to hockey, our national sport.5 1
METHODS OF ATTACK
It was mentioned earlier that the Wooldridge52 case pointed out
the problem of allowing a competitor to escape liability as long as he
was doing that which would enable him to win the particular compe-
tition. Thus, in that case there was no liability partly because the
error of judgment causing the accident was made with victory in mind
and under those circumstances was entirely reasonable. The folly in
this thinking however can be readily seen if it is extended more fully.
If H was entitled to go 'all out to succeed', what was to prevent the other
competitors from doing the same, with the result that any spectator in
the arena would be placed in imminent peril?5 3
In recognizing this problem it should not be forgotten that differ-
ent sports require different efforts. For instance, it is generally
assumed that when a baseball player attempts to hit a baseball he
does so with as much force as possible. Similarly in track and field
a runner makes every effort to go as fast as he can. Obviously then
there can be no negligence for trying to hit the ball too hard or run-
ning too fast. But where control is mandatory such as in horse shows,
48 The baseball figures were obtained from an article by Bruno Cola-
pietro in (1960-61) 46 CoRN. L. Q. 140 titled The Promoter's Liability for
Sports Spectator Injuries.
49 Mr. Colapietro used figures from the 1959 baseball season but since
there is no reason to assume that the incidence of injuries has changed to any
great extent (especially since relatively few more protective devices havc
been installed even in the newer stadiums) the same figures would be relevan
today.
50 See supra, note 17.
51 Although lacross is technically our national sport, hockey is much more
commonly played and closely followed and most Canadians think of hockey
as our national game.
52 Supra, note 9.
53 Goodhard The Sportsman's Charter (1962) 78 L.Q.R. 490, 495.
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figure skating, and auto-racing, to exceed the limits of control should
constitute negligence and where spectators are injured as a result
of such excess, they should be entitled to recover. Control in such
cases would be that which should be exercised by the reasonable
competitor. As a direct corollary, where spectators are injured as a
result of actions by competitors that are not recognized as part of
the game, they should also be allowed to recover.
The basis for this opinion stems from the PayneS4 case. Liability
was established there when a spectator was hit by the stick of one of
the players while he was fighting with another player. It is important
to note that the defendant was given a penalty by the referee for this
fighting. Thus his actions could not be considered as part of the game
for if they were they would not have been penalized. Since they were
not part of the game, they were negligent actions and since these
negligent actions resulted in injury to the plaintiff, the latter was
allowed recovery.
Now let us extend this to the more common occurrence of pucks
being shot into the crowd. There is a penalty in the National Hockey
League for intentionally throwing or shooting a puck into the
crowd.55 Following through on the analogy: where a spectator is
injured by such a puck he should be allowed recovery on the same
basis as in the Payne case; namely the negligence of the player.
This argument is weakened somewhat from a practical viewpoint
because the penalty is rarely, if ever, called,5 6 perhaps because the
league office realizes the danger and instructs their officials not to
make such calls.5 7 This view of liability was recognized to some
extent in the Wooldridge case as indicated in the following proviso:
But provided the competition or game is being performed within the rules
and the requirements of the sport and by a person of adequate skill and
competence the spectator does not expect his safety to be regarded by the
participant.8
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
As the situation exists now, recovery for Larry Grafstein will
be difficult if not impossible to obtain. This result is one which our
society should not condone. But one only has to look as far as the
Murray59 decision to discover the extent to which the court will go
so as not to impose liability. As mentioned earlier, a child of less
than a certain age (e.g. 13) should not be held to have consented to
54 Supra, note 14.
55 Rule 50 (a) of the National Hockey League Rule Book states: "No
player or goalkeeper shall delay the game by deliberately shooting or throw-
Ing the puck out of the playing area".
56 The writer can recall only one such penalty while watching approxi-
mately 40 games this season.
57 When I suggested this to Mr. Obodiak he stated that it was classified
information and only the President would be able to answer me. I assumed
the President would not admit to such a league decision and therefore did not
contact him.
58 Supra, note 9 at 56.
59 Supra, note 7.
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the risks of attending a sporting event. Nor should this consent be
imputed to a parent accompanying the child. There are sufficient num-
bers of children in attendance at such events that it could be argued
that the "reasonable spectator" should take account of these young-
sters. Also it is the child who suffers the physical damage and it is
the child who must attempt to get out of the way of the flying object.
Thus more protection than is presently provided should be given
the spectator and if the courts will not provide that protection (and
as of now they will not) then it is up to the legislature to do so.
In Canada, where hockey is so highly regarded, there is a re-
luctance to restrict our national game in any way. But this is not
sufficient reason to refuse to impose liability. Thus my proposal that
where the participant-defendant can be held negligent, recovery
should be allowed, is an initial step in extending liability to the
degree needed. But surely 7 year old Larry Grafstein should not be
denied recovery simply because Bobby Baun did not receive a penalty
(and therefore was not negligent) when the puck slammed into his
mouth. One solution would be to grant recovery on the basis of
strict liability with the owners being held liable for injuries such as
those under examination here. These are jurisprudential solutions to
the problem but in the complete rejection of such interpretation of
the present law by the courts an alternative must be found.
The scheme here proposed is that a fund be established from
the proceeds of the purchase of tickets to the event. It is to this fund
that a spectator can turn if he is injured while watching the event
for which he has paid. This plan would operate on similar basis to
that of the Workmen's Compensation Board. A panel would be
formed to which application would be made by the injured spectator.
The panel would take into account actual out-of-pocket expenses plus
any expenses resulting from loss of wages and any general damages
that the members felt were warranted. Thus the result would be the
same to the spectator had his case been successfully resolved in the
courts.
Such a scheme would no doubt result in slightly higher admis-
sion prices and would in effect amount to a loss distribution plan,
which would be a less expensive and more summary procedure than
the present resort to the courts. Notwithstanding such plans being
anathema to many people the fact remains that there is present in
today's life considerable difficulty caused by non-recoverable acci-
dents such as Larry Grafstein's. It is no answer to say that "the
timorous may stay at home". 6° The timorous will not stay at home,
nor should they and if the courts will not recognize this fact then
it is up to the legislature to provide the protection needed.
60 Murphy-Steeplechase Amusement Co. 166 N.E. 173, 174 (1929) (N.Y.
Court of appeals) per Cardozo, J.
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